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Part 1: Introduction
he stability of the financial system and the potential for 
systemic events to alter its functioning have long been 
critical issues for central bankers and researchers. Develop-
ments such as securitization and greater tradability of financial 
instruments, the rise in industry consolidation, growing cross-
border financial activity, terrorist threats, and a higher 
dependence on computer technologies underscore the 
importance of this research area. Recent events, however, such 
as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the collapse 
of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), 
suggest that older models of systemic shocks in the financial 
system may no longer fully capture the possible channels of 
propagation and feedback arising from major disturbances. 
Nor can existing models account entirely for the increasing 
complexity of the financial system, the spectrum of financial 
and information flows, or the endogenous behavior of different 
agents in the system. Fresh thinking on systemic risk is 
therefore required.
With that goal in mind, in May 2006 the National Academy 
of Sciences and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
convened a conference in New York to promote a better 
understanding of systemic risk. The sessions brought together 
a broad group of scientists, engineers, economists, and 
financial market practitioners to engage in a cross-disciplinary 
examination of systemic risk that could yield insights from 
the natural and physical sciences useful to researchers in 
economics and finance.1 Accordingly, presenters from the 
natural and mathematical sciences and the engineering 
disciplines provided examples of tools and techniques used 
1The conference program can be found in Appendix A.
to study systemic collapse in interactive systems in nature 
and engineering. Similarly, research economists presented 
studies of systemic risk in cross-border investments, liquidity 
risk, and the payments system. To provide a context for 
the discussions, risk managers at large finance institutions 
described how systemic risk and shocks in the financial system 
affect trading activities.
Transitioning from a Bank-Based
to a Market-Based Financial System
Financial market practitioners began the conference by 
highlighting various aspects of systemic risk and systemic 
events in the financial system. The topics of the presentations 
ranged from historical systemic episodes, such as the liquidity 
crisis of 1998 and the failure of LTCM, to risk assessment 
techniques, such as value-at-risk (VaR) analysis and scenario 
analysis. Charles Lucas of AIG (since retired), a member of 
the National Academy’s Board on Mathematical Sciences and 
Their Applications, introduced the first session by asking 
the fundamental question: What is systemic risk? 
According to Lucas, economists’ theoretical understanding 
of systemic risk stemmed from the experience of the Great 
Depression and specifically from John Maynard Keynes’s 
interpretation of that experience in General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes aimed the 
formulation of his “general theory” at capturing the dynamics 
that allowed an economy to transition to an inferior but stable 
The views expressed in this summary do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 
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equilibrium, in the process overturning the normal full-
employment equilibrium that defined classical models. During 
the Great Depression, the economy underwent a shock that was 
sustained by sympathetic movements throughout the financial 
system—a sequence of events that has come to be called 
“contagion.” Because of policy missteps and a feedback loop 
with the financial system, the real economy settled into a 
persistent state of underutilized resources and unemployment. 
Despite structural changes since that time, the idea of a 
feedback loop between the financial and real sectors of the 
economy that leads to an inferior equilibrium with negative 
consequences for the real economy remains pertinent to 
current analysis of financial stability.
That system has changed dramatically since the Great 
Depression, as described in the conference background 
paper on the evolution of systemic risk.2 Though banks 
still play a large role, many functions that defined their 
traditional domain are increasingly performed by securities 
markets and nonbank market participants. For example, 
hedge funds, private equity groups, and other fund 
managers now control larger shares of financial capital and 
take active roles in asset and credit markets. Crises in this 
more market-based financial system, such as the stock 
market crash of October 1987 and the market liquidity crisis 
of 1998, fit a general pattern of rapid decline in the price of 
some asset or class of assets, leading to a drop in liquidity. 
The result is contagion, in the form of further sympathetic 
price declines and a shift in market conditions marked by 
severely reduced financial market activity and potential 
negative effects on the real economy. Likewise, although the 
linkage mechanisms may have changed completely since the 
Great Depression, and despite the skepticism Keynes’s 
2“Systemic Risk and the Financial System,” by Darryll Hendricks, John 
Kambhu, and Patricia Mosser; the paper can be found in Appendix B of this 
volume. 
theory received from the research community at the time, 
this simple model captures the mechanisms underlying the 
Depression. The endogenous shock in the United States that 
led to the inferior equilibrium then was a stock market crash 
followed by a wave of bank runs and loss of liquidity in a 
feedback mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy. As Lucas 
suggested, this comparison offers a basic historical analogy 
illuminating some of the modern phenomena of systemic 
risks, such as sudden “regime shifts” in the financial system 
and the role of feedback mechanisms.
The conference background paper by Hendricks, Kambhu, 
and Mosser also describes the now well-studied phenomenon 
of the “bank run.” In the classical model, a commercial bank 
makes illiquid loans on the asset side of its balance sheet, and 
takes demand deposits on the liabilities side that it is obligated 
to pay back at any time. In a bank run, even though each 
depositor would be willing to leave his or her funds on deposit, 
the belief that other depositors are likely to withdraw theirs 
causes all rational depositors to try to withdraw their funds as 
quickly as possible. A run on the bank results, because the 
bank’s loans cannot be liquidated immediately at their full 
value, leaving the bank with no funds for the last depositors in 
line. In such a scenario, a run can be triggered by concerns 
about liquidity even if the bank is otherwise solvent. 
Moreover, in this model, self-fulfilling prophecies can make 
bank runs contagious: If depositors witness a run on one bank, 
they may believe that runs are more likely to occur on others. 
This scenario can be attributed to several factors. For example, 
the issue that sparked a run on one bank, such as excessive loan 
exposure to real estate or the oil industry, may be perceived to 
affect other banks, or one or more other banks may have 
significant interbank exposures to the affected institution. 
As the Great Depression revealed, the withdrawal of 
funding liquidity resulting from bank runs can accentuate 
economic downturns and generally influence the real 
economy as lending is curtailed to creditworthy entities.3 
Thus, the primary policy approaches to managing financial 
instability in a bank-oriented financial system—lender-of-
last-resort facilities by the central bank, deposit insurance, 
and banking supervision to ensure credit quality in loan 
portfolios—were all aimed at preventing or mitigating 
the effects of these potentially catastrophic withdrawals 
of funding liquidity from the system. As the relative 
importance of banks as financial intermediaries has declined 
with the growth of market-based financial intermediation, 
market-based systemic events such as the stock market crash 
of 1987 and the failure of LTCM have shifted the emphasis 
from funding liquidity to market liquidity. Moreover, as 
3See the conference background paper described in footnote 2.
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Federal Reserve Board Governor Donald L. Kohn observed, 
the Federal Reserve is midway through a long process of 
adapting its policy tools to this new environment.4 
As Hendricks, Kambhu, and Mosser describe in their 
conference background paper (Appendix B of this volume),  
the shift from a financial system dominated by banks to one 
dominated by markets has as its hallmark a broadening of the 
types of activities that banks and other financial intermediaries 
engage in and the assets that they invest in. The large financial 
institutions at the core of the system now intermediate the 
movement of capital in many ways: They assist businesses in 
the issuance of new stocks and bonds directly to the market 
(investment banking), they intermediate secondary-market 
trading of stocks and bonds after issuance on behalf of clients 
(market making), they lend directly to households and 
businesses (traditional commercial banking), and they manage 
asset portfolios on behalf of individuals and institutions (asset 
management). This latter example has led to the development 
of new market entities that act as vehicles for household 
savings, such as mutual funds and pension funds, as well as 
more leveraged entities, such as hedge funds.
The conference background paper also explains how a 
securities-market-based financial system works best when 
capital markets are liquid. In this context, liquidity refers to 
tradability: Markets are liquid when any individual trade is 
unlikely to have a major effect on the asset price because large 
numbers of willing traders are on the buy and sell sides of the 
market. Liquidity normally rests on a number of foundations; 
foremost are market making, trading, and arbitrage. Market 
makers buy and sell securities out of inventory they maintain 
to meet customer demand, thereby providing intertemporal 
liquidity to smooth out short-run imbalances in supply and 
demand. Traders contribute to market liquidity by trading on 
bets that prices will converge to long-run fundamental levels. 
This activity speeds the convergence of prices to fundamental 
levels and provides stability to the market. Systemic shocks 
occur when one of these foundations is compromised.
Market-oriented crises tend to begin with a large asset price 
decline that becomes self-sustaining. Normally, when asset 
prices drop sharply, investors step up to buy assets that have 
declined sufficiently—an action that largely prevents market 
stress from worsening. This type of stabilizing correction is 
natural for a well-functioning, efficient asset market. In 
systemic crises, however, investors and traders are either 
unable or unwilling to step in, perhaps because their losses 
have limited their risk-taking and market-making capacity or 
because a structural failure in, say, the payments or settlement 
system has made such a step difficult. As prices decline, more 
market participants either sell from a change in their risk 
4Governor Kohn’s observations, as reported in this summary, are based on his 
conference remarks, “The Evolving Nature of the Financial System: Financial 
Crises and the Role of the Central Bank.”
appetite or are forced to sell by a tightening of financing 
constraints, and prices are pushed down. Like the self- 
fulfilling-prophecy aspect of the bank-run model, this 
sequence of events can be self-reinforcing as market 
participants retire to the sidelines.
Market-based systemic crises are often characterized 
by a coordination failure: A wide cross-section of market 
participants simultaneously decide to reduce risk taking and 
effectively refrain from financial activities, such as trading 
stocks, issuing debt and equity, and lending. While no one 
institution is necessarily insolvent or illiquid, each firm reduces 
its activity and risk to protect capital. In aggregate, the firms’ 
actions combine to reduce financial market activity severely 
as asset prices fall, possibly harming the real economy in the 
process as the provision of financial services to otherwise 
creditworthy entities is curtailed and declines in asset prices 
impact firms’ balance sheets. As Governor Kohn explained, the 
stock market crash of 1987 followed this pattern: simultaneous 
efforts to reduce equity market exposures were followed by 
a broad pullback in all risk taking. 
In a market-based systemic crisis, as in the bank-run model, 
the actions and beliefs of individual participants across the 
financial system can combine to disrupt the entire system, even 
though the great majority of institutions are not at risk of 
collapse.5 When cast in these terms, the notion of systemic risk 
in the financial system bears a strong resemblance to the 
dynamics of many complex adaptive systems in the physical 
world. Many of the features of complex systems described by 
conference participants from the natural and mathematical 
sciences are clearly present in the financial system. For 
example, Simon Levin of Princeton University cited non-
linearities, multiple stable states, hysteresis, contagion, and 
synchrony as features common to all complex adaptive 
systems. These features are evident in models of financial 
crises: 1) contagion is seen in the self-reinforcing character 
of price declines and transmission of liquidity shocks across 
institutions; 2) multiple stable states and hysteresis can 
appear in the move to an inferior but stable equilibrium; and 
5See the conference background paper described in footnote 2.
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3) nonlinearities in expectations and investment decisions can 
lead to sharp changes in the volatility and covariation of asset 
prices in an apparent regime shift, as discussed by risk 
managers later in this introduction. This commonality between 
financial and other complex adaptive systems points to the 
broad social importance of the study of systemic events.
Systemic Risk as a Generic Problem
In the world at large, complex systems abound. Accordingly, 
the instability of these systems and their potential for large and 
potentially catastrophic regime shifts are a dominant social 
concern—and one of high importance to many environmental 
and engineering sciences. For example, atmospheric scientists 
examine such questions in the context of climate change, as do 
fishery managers concerned with the sudden collapse of certain 
economically important fish stocks. As the presentations by 
Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota and Yacov 
Haimes of the University of Virginia made clear, engineers 
grapple with similar issues to prevent disruptions to the North 
American power grid and to analyze for government entities 
the wider economic effects of terrorist attacks. 
The ubiquity of such problems across so many fields 
suggests the possibility of finding common principles at work. 
As George Sugihara of the University of California at San Diego 
explained, engineers and public health professionals alike may 
be interested in how actions to address high-frequency but 
low-amplitude events, such as small floods or small outbreaks 
of disease, might predispose a system to low-frequency but 
very-high-amplitude disturbances. For instance, overuse of 
antibiotics to combat small-scale outbreaks of disease can lead 
to high-consequence outbreaks of antibiotic-resistant illnesses. 
Or, in an example from recent experience, the construction of 
levees in New Orleans to protect against intermediate-strength 
storm surges led to the higher consequence damage from 
the lower probability Hurricane Katrina. 
Recent studies that have identified many common 
characteristics of nonlinear complex adaptive systems in the 
physical world may point to a tentative vocabulary of systemic 
risk. A key concept that can be used to describe the process of 
adverse systemic change in both ecology and finance is the 
tendency toward a rapid and large transition from one stable 
state to another, possibly less favorable, state—what one might 
call a regime shift. Levin cited this phenomenon in the 
eutrophication of bodies of water, in which a shock, such as 
excessive heat, can lead to overenrichment of the water with 
nutrients, resulting in excessive growth of some organisms and 
a depletion of oxygen that is damaging to other populations. 
The new state of the body of water is a new stable equilibrium. 
Somewhat analogously, in financial markets, an exogenous 
change in the economic environment can lead to new profit 
opportunities in certain assets that attract capital and, if 
investment in the assets is excessive, to an asset price bubble 
vulnerable to a change in investor confidence. If a shock 
triggers a collapse of asset prices, there is a risk of a broader 
contraction if the normal self-correcting features of markets 
fail to work. Absent those self-corrections, the flight to quality 
by investors seeking safe assets could become a self-sustaining 
transition to a state with lower levels of credit and real 
economic activity.
In Levin’s terminology, in both situations some shock leads 
to coordinated behavior within the system, a process known as 
“synchrony”—excessive growth of nutrients in the first 
example and excessive investment in an asset price bubble in 
the second. This synchronized behavior leads to reinforcing 
feedbacks, causing the initial shock to spread and cause 
contagion. Under the combined effect of the shock and 
contagion, a system makes a transition, or regime shift, from a 
stable state to an inferior stable state while shedding energy so 
that it cannot readily recover its original state, a process known 
as “hysteresis.” Levin explained that much of the research on 
complex systems in the natural world has focused on the 
properties of robustness and resilience to shocks that either can 
prevent regime shifts and hysteresis from taking place, or can 
lead to recovery if they occur.
The commonality of stability and resilience to shocks in 
complex systems suggests that approaches to risk management 
in natural and physical systems could be pertinent to financial 
risk management. Amin and Haimes each illustrated some of 
the methods for managing risk in engineering systems, such as 
“multi-objective trade-off analysis,” in which Pareto-optimal 
actions are derived by considering the subjective probabilities 
and payoffs associated with different shocks. The methods 
presented bore some semblance to those used in financial risk 
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analysis, and much of the subsequent conference discussion 
centered around the prospect of adapting methods from 
various engineering fields to financial risk management. 
Adaptation is clearly necessary because the range of behavior 
in financial markets is not mirrored in, say, the behaviors of 
humans operating a complex engineered system. A risk analysis 
of an engineered system can assume that the people involved 
are attempting to fulfill their roles, which are relatively defined, 
and share a common objective. In contrast, in the financial 
system traders and investors operate in a competitive 
environment and might change their roles and behaviors 
opportunistically and creatively. 
Systemic Risk in the Financial System
Systemic risk in the financial system is difficult to define 
precisely. Although a literature on financial crises and systemic 
risk exists, a range of views can be found on what constitutes 
systemic risk.6 
An adage among traders is that, in times of crisis, everything 
is correlated. Though conference participants did not share a 
consensus on the definition of systemic risk, the descriptions of 
systemic events by risk managers at the conference reflected 
this view. For example, Thomas Daula of Morgan Stanley 
described systemic events as regime shifts in which periods of 
extreme volatility combine with losses of liquidity to produce 
solvency risk. These crisis periods, according to Daula, “are 
characterized by very sharp increases in correlations and, 
therefore, they look and feel a lot like a regime shift—and a 
regime shift where you are moving from a normal regime, 
where there are relatively low correlations amongst financial 
markets, to a different regime, where you have extremely high 
volatility and a sharp spike in correlation.”
6For a central banking perspective, see Brimmer (1989); Bernanke and Gertler 
(1990, pp. 87-114) describe links between financial distress and the real economy. 
For a recent paper on systemic risk, see Chan et al. (2006).
Under such regime shifts, the normal assumptions culled 
from historical experience that guide day-to-day trading break 
down. As D. Wilson Ervin of Credit Suisse observed in regard 
to the Russian default and the collapse of LTCM: “The most 
memorable part of this episode were the questions around 
fundamental issues that were normally unquestioned in day-
to-day activities, about the reliability of your counterparties, 
about how markets would work under various circumstances, 
about whether liquidity would be there under certain 
circumstances.” In the presence of such uncertainty and 
market panic, traders can tend toward herd movement as they 
attempt to avoid losses—what the literature refers to as “phase 
locking”—and the normal mechanisms of price determination 
can break down. According to Robert Litzenberger of Azimuth 
Trust: “What happens is, in what we might refer to as crisis 
periods or liquidation periods . . . prices are generated 
internally by the market microstructure. Trades that were 
previously uncorrelated become correlated because they are 
being liquidated at the same time.”
In the tentative vocabulary of systemic risk suggested above, 
the self-reinforcing uncertainty and market panic that can 
characterize a systemic episode are a clear example of 
contagion. The jump in correlations appearing at the onset of 
a systemic event can in turn be seen as an example of self-
reinforcing feedback and synchrony. Furthermore, the 
transition from a normally functioning market to one in which 
prices are generated by the internal market microstructure is 
accompanied by widespread and simultaneous liquidations. 
Financing constraints and the loss of liquidity make a return to 
the pre-crisis state very difficult—an asymmetrical transition 
and example of hysteresis. Thus, the notion of systemic risk, 
which financial market participants are at least viscerally 
acquainted with, can be worked into the framework of complex 
systems research from other fields.
While conference participants from the financial industry 
agreed on the “look” and “feel” of systemic episodes, there was 
some diversity of opinion on the more academic question of 
what actually constitutes systemic risk or a systemic event. 
Darryll Hendricks of UBS compared systemic risk with the 
Loch Ness monster: People claim that it exists or must exist, but 
nobody can point to a definitive episode. As Hendricks noted, 
most definitions of systemic events involve a transmission 
of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy—
for instance, disruptions in credit provision as well as a 
propagation mechanism such as self-reinforcing feedback. 
Therefore, is a systemic event simply one that creates 
externalities? Most would probably agree that this is too low 
a threshold for classifying an event as systemic. Lucas put 
forward the idea that a proper definition of systemic risk would 
involve transition from a stable equilibrium to some inferior 
Systemic risk in the financial system is 
difficult to define precisely. Although a 
literature on financial crises and systemic 
risk exists, a range of views can be found 
on what constitutes systemic risk.8 Introduction
but stable equilibrium, as explained above. This idea accords 
well with the regime-shift characterization used by financial 
industry participants. However, questions remain about how 
to characterize these equilibria. Was an event systemic because 
a disturbance propagated across diverse actors through self-
reinforcing feedback, or did some policy mistake form the 
common cause of the disturbance to all actors, such as 
insufficient liquidity provision during the Great Depression? 
Systemic Risk and Regulation 
With the range of opinions on the proper identification of 
systemic risk, it is natural to wonder why the definition is so 
important. The 1987 stock market crash and the 1998 nexus 
of the Russian default, the failure of LTCM, and the resulting 
liquidity crisis were episodes of systemic magnitude pro-
pagated and sustained by self-reinforcing mechanisms in the 
financial sector, and these episodes had potential consequences 
for the real economy. The definition is important, Daula 
explained, because regulation to ameliorate systemic risk 
constitutes a tax, and therefore a clear understanding of the 
risks is needed for the most protection at the lowest potential 
cost. Regulation is a tax in the sense that direct expenditures are 
required to comply with regulatory directives, and potential 
costs imposed in terms of efficiency losses in the allocation 
of capital. For an example of the latter, consider capital 
requirements that vary by the nature of one’s business or the 
assets on one’s balance sheet; they can create a wedge between 
market prices absent regulation and actual market prices. One 
could also wonder if a particular regulatory regime has a cost 
effect on the banking sector’s industrial organization. For 
example, do certain forms of capital requirements—or, more 
generally, the costs of compliance with regulatory regimes—
encourage consolidation? 
Given these considerations, the importance of a sound 
method for identifying systemic risk becomes obvious. 
Without it, policymakers face a strong incentive to build 
expansive regulatory regimes capable of influencing practices 
that may or may not truly reduce systemic risk, because the 
potentially disastrous consequences of a real systemic event 
would justify the costs of such regulation. As Governor Kohn 
stated: “The natural inclination is to take more intrusive 
actions that minimize the risks of immediate disruption, and 
this inclination is probably exacerbated by ignorance and 
uncertainty.” He explained that too much regulation could 
harm efficiency or generate moral hazard as market 
participants begin to take regulators’ corrective measures for 
granted and increase risk taking. For example, they may fail to 
engage in adequate due diligence when extending credit or fail 
to maintain adequate capital for the risks they undertake. 
Further, to borrow from a theme raised by Levin, excessive 
regulation could introduce rigidities that may limit the natural 
flexibility of markets to respond to shocks.
A detailed understanding of what constitutes systemic risk 
is therefore important to forming a regulatory regime that 
balances costs and benefits. Indeed, in all the roles 
policymakers fill in preventing systemic events and mitigating 
systemic risk, a proper analytical framework is crucial for 
defining the correct scope and mode of action. For central 
bankers in particular, a clear method for identifying systemic 
risk and the onset of systemic events is critical for decision 
making on whether and how to intervene.
The Roles of Policymakers
The Federal Reserve’s role in setting monetary policy gives it the 
ability to mitigate the consequences of systemic events by easing 
access to liquidity. After the August 1998 financial market 
turmoil associated with the Russian loan default and the 
subsequent collapse of LTCM, for example, the Federal Open 
Market Committee lowered the target federal funds rate to 
soften the effects of “increasing weakness in foreign economies 
and of less accommodative financial conditions domestically.”7 
Other policymaking roles assumed by the Federal Reserve—
services provider, bank supervisor and regulator, and crisis 
manager—also help to position it to mitigate systemic events. 
As a financial services provider, the Federal Reserve, through 
its Fedwire system, is the backbone of the interbank payments 
system. The conference presentation on Fedwire, discussed in 
part 4 of this report, highlighted how important this role is 
in tempering the effects of a crisis. Referring to the hours after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the study highlighted 
how infrastructure disruptions and the resulting payments 
miscoordination threatened to seriously disrupt the payments 
system. In response, the Federal Reserve extended the operating 
7Federal Open Market Committee Statement, September 29, 1998 (<http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/1998/19980929/>).
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hours of Fedwire and increased liquidity provision by using the 
discount window and open market operations, actions that 
significantly reduced the impact of the disruption. This episode 
exemplifies the Federal Reserve’s role as crisis manager.
Governor Kohn remarked that the Federal Reserve and 
other regulatory agencies, as banking supervisors, can do much 
to reduce systemic risk by maintaining a healthy banking 
system. Collective efforts of regulators and the private sector 
to enhance market discipline, improve risk management 
practices, and strengthen the clearing and settlement systems 
reduce the likelihood that a sharp change in asset prices or 
questions about a major market participant will lead to a 
systemic financial crisis. In today’s market-dominated 
financial system, banks still have a large role to play in 
financing traders’ securities positions and in clearing and 
settling trades in their brokerage activities. In their role as 
providers and conduits of liquidity, healthy banks can be 
bulwarks against the propagation of financial turmoil.8
As a crisis manager, the Federal Reserve can avert many 
problems by monitoring conditions and identifying risks as they 
arise. Indeed, as Governor Kohn explained, a common element in 
the Federal Reserve’s response to both the 1987 stock market crisis 
and the 1998 liquidity crisis was its public acknowledgment that a 
crisis was under way. In announcing a crisis and articulating its 
response, the Federal Reserve reassured market participants that 
it was working to mitigate the systemic effects of the crisis; such 
reassurance can go a long way toward encouraging a return to 
risk taking. In both episodes, the Federal Reserve also used open 
market operations to ease reserve market conditions and the 
stance of monetary policy, monitored the flow of credit through 
the financial system, and worked with lenders to emphasize their 
collective interest in avoiding a credit gridlock. 
The Federal Reserve’s actions relied on an early determi-
nation of the potential systemic effects of the two events. Largely 
as a result of these actions, neither the 1987 event nor the 1998 
episode led to a disruption in real economic activity.
Systemic Risk in Historical
Perspective: The Events of 1998 
Governor Kohn observed that the Federal Reserve has been 
involved in a long process of adapting its tools to the market-
dominated financial system that is still emerging today. 
Accordingly, the 1987 stock market crash and the 1998 
8 For analysis of banks as liquidity providers in a crisis, see Saidenberg and 
Strahan (1999) and Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2006).
liquidity crisis are natural case studies to examine when 
defining systemic risk, as neither was triggered by the bank-run 
phenomenon that characterized many systemic problems in 
the nineteenth century. 
The events of 1987 and 1998 had many common elements. 
First, both began with sharp movements in asset prices that 
were exacerbated by market conditions—portfolio insurance 
in 1987 and the closing out of positions in 1998. Second, 
market participants became highly uncertain about the 
dynamics of the market, the true value of assets, and the future 
movement of asset prices. In terms of the regime-shift scenario 
described earlier, events outpaced the standard risk manage-
ment systems, which had been based on historical data and 
experience. Third, large and rapid price movements called into 
question the creditworthiness of counterparties, which could 
no longer be judged by now-obsolete financial statements. 
Fourth, the decline in asset prices decreased wealth and raised 
the cost of capital, developments that threatened to reduce 
both consumption and investment in the real economy. 
Although the 1987 and 1998 events shared many features, 
conference participants tended to focus on the more recent 
1998 episode because financial institutions, instruments, and 
practices then were more similar to the way they are today. 
The potential negative effects on the real economy and the 
systemic character of this episode were highlighted by the 
withdrawal of investors from the commercial paper market.
As noted by Ervin, the events of 1998 were catalyzed by the 
Russian default. In 1998, Russia was in a precarious position 
as a fledgling democracy attempting to transition to a market-
based economy. It had a high dependence on energy exports 
at a time when the price of oil was dropping, a massive trade 
deficit, an unsustainable pegged exchange rate, and a large 
government budget deficit. It was also financed mainly by 
short-term debt. Despite a large loan package in July 1998 from 
the International Monetary Fund, a sustained reversal in 
market sentiment led the Russian government to announce 
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in August of that year that it would default on short-term 
local-currency debt. The result was disastrous: Many Russian 
counterparties failed, and liquidity in Russian instruments 
dried up.9 
Investor losses were estimated to be on the order of
$100 billion. As Ervin explained, every working assumption 
about the Russian market came into doubt: the rules, the 
participants, the prices, the functioning of markets, even the 
legal system. This was surely a systemic crisis for Russia. 
Moreover, it threatened to become a systemic crisis for the 
international financial system when the market turmoil 
affected a particular hedge fund, LTCM, and the liquidity 
of core markets in the financial system.
In the mid-to-late 1990s, LTCM was a very large and 
well-known hedge fund, both highly leveraged and highly 
successful. Its primary investment strategy centered on finding  
arbitrage opportunities or near-arbitrage opportunities in 
which the market seemed to be out of line with long-term 
economic fundamentals—a trading strategy based on the idea 
that certain pricing gaps will close over some (potentially long) 
period of time. As part of its trading strategy, Ervin explained, 
LTCM would tend to buy older, illiquid Treasury bonds, then 
short-sell current, on-the-run Treasury bonds and eke out a 
small yield differential between the two. The goal was to 
capture a small yield differential in relative asset prices, 
allowing LTCM to earn steady returns as relative prices 
converged to fair values while the fund avoided directional risk. 
At the time at least, this strategy was considered somewhat 
state-of-the-art, and many financial entities attempted to 
emulate it, if not to mirror LTCM’s positions outright.
The primary problem with LTCM’s strategy was that, as 
a relative-value trader, it was very exposed to liquidity shocks 
and correlation assumptions, even if the fundamentals under-
lying its positions were correct. In the days following the 
Russian default, there was a large flight to quality in developed 
markets that caused credit spreads to widen sharply. Interest-
ingly, this trend was not limited to U.S. corporate debt; interest 
rate swap spreads—an indication of the credit conditions 
of international banks—also widened sharply. As this shock 
rippled through the financial system during August, it also 
began to affect equity markets, and the Dow dropped 
357 points on August 27 and a further 512 points on August 31. 
Implied volatility in prices of equity options also increased 
substantially, more than doubling its pre-crisis levels. 
These events were preceded by the decision by Salomon 
Brothers to close its bond arbitrage group in the spring and 
summer of 1998. The departure of such a large bond trader 
potentially left the market with less liquidity than it would have 
9This discussion draws heavily on Ervin’s conference presentation.
had, because of both the liquidation of Salomon’s very large 
positions in the months prior and the absence of a large player 
whose trading otherwise would have contributed to market 
liquidity. Vincent Reinhart of the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors and Litzenberger pointed to the Salomon decision as 
creating the initial market stresses that escalated with the Russian 
default and the emergence of LTCM’s financial problems. 
The mechanisms that led to the subsequent fall of LTCM 
highlight aspects of the nonlinearities and reinforcing 
feedbacks cited in the conference’s discussion of a securities-
market-based financial system. LTCM had a strategy of 
targeting the volatility of the Standard and Poor’s index as a 
type of risk control mechanism, using it as a benchmark against 
which to assess the value-at-risk of its own positions. VaR 
analysis is a widespread portfolio-management strategy that 
calculates the maximum potential loss over a certain time 
period, given a specified level of confidence. Historical 
volatilities are used to form a VaR estimate, Litzenberger 
explained. ARCH and GARCH methods (autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity and generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively) are common tools 
for obtaining a volatility estimate based on historical volatility 
and covariance. The usual way of employing these estimation 
techniques at the time was to consider historical volatilities, 
not just volatilities during hypothetical crisis states.
The pressure on LTCM’s position caused by the liquidation 
of Salomon’s bond arbitrage group was combined with 
pressure from the widening of credit spreads following the 
Russian default. As VaR models reflecting the spike in price 
volatility indicated higher risk, market participants began to 
liquidate their positions defensively. This reaction illustrates 
the concept of reinforcing feedbacks: As volatility increased, 
market participants reasoned that risk had also increased, 
so they began to liquidate those positions, a step that in turn 
led to further elevations in volatility and more decisions to 
liquidate. The process also illustrates the importance of 
linkages and nonlinearities in systemic events: Even though 
Russian instruments were a small proportion of LTCM’s 
overall portfolio, market participants began to question their 
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own rationale for holding other, non-Russian positions that 
LTCM also held. Thus, they began liquidating those positions in 
anticipation of liquidation spilling over into other markets, and 
in this way a seemingly small disturbance propagated quickly.
As Litzenberger explained, in the 1997 run-up to LTCM’s 
failure, the arbitrage market was marked by high liquidity 
and low volatility. Under these conditions, to maintain a target 
risk profile (for example, VaR) when volatility was low, traders 
such as LTCM would leverage their positions. Recall that 
LTCM maintained a strategy of targeting its risk taking on 
the volatility of the Standard and Poor’s index; the fund’s 
response to the situation in 1997 was essentially to add leverage 
by returning a substantial portion of capital to its investors. 
This strategy was consistent with attempting to maintain 
profitability when trading opportunities were harder to find as 
trades were mean-reverting faster. According to Litzenberger, 
this would have been an entirely reasonable strategy if 
conditions in 1997 had constituted a steady state. However, 
the liquidation of Salomon’s bond arbitrage group and the 
Russian default combined to disrupt this steady state and 
cause a considerable rise in volatility. The subsequent apparent 
increase in risk triggered widescale liquidations, as the assump-
tions underlying these positions came into serious doubt. 
The resulting pressure on LTCM led it to send investors a letter 
on September 2 asking for more capital. Just three weeks later, 
the firm was taken over by its creditor banks to enable orderly 
liquidation of the fund’s positions.
Ervin explained that, from the viewpoint of derivatives 
trading desks, the events leading up to the collapse of LTCM 
resembled a regime shift: At times, trading in U.S. dollar 
interest rate swaps dried up completely; pricing for typical 
bonds, such as investment-grade mortgages, widened to the 
point that one could not get a price, or at least a real price. 
“During this period, people simply didn’t have confidence 
they understood what was going on. They weren’t sure they 
understood the new rules of the game, who would survive, 
and how they should play,” he said. 
Beyond the breakdown of trading models based on 
historical correlations, systemic events have a psychological 
character, as all the rules seem to collapse and participants 
enter into a state of high uncertainty about their counter-
parties. According to Governor Kohn, this points to a crucial 
role for policymakers: 
Heightened uncertainty is the key characteristic of 
episodes of financial instability. The central bank may not 
have any more information than market participants do. 
In economic models, based on such uncertainties, it is the 
central bank’s willingness to act in the face of uncertainty 
that differentiates it from other market participants and 
gives it a positive role to play during financial crises.
This role must be buttressed by a clearer understanding of 
the fundamental dynamics underlying the securities-market-
based financial system; yet many obstacles to this ideal remain, 
both for market participants seeking to insulate themselves 
from the effects of crises and especially for regulators seeking 
to prevent them. Among these obstacles are the difficulty in 
simulating financial crises, the lack of historical episodes to 
study, and—crucially for entities such as the Federal Reserve—
hindrances to the types of data sharing among market 
participants and regulators that would allow central banks 
to act with certainty during systemic crises.
Analytical Issues
In a bank-dominated financial system, Governor Kohn 
observed, it is much easier to gather the information necessary 
to regulate effectively against the possibility of systemic 
disruptions. In such a context, the critical information would 
come from fellow bank regulators with which the Federal 
Reserve had been working and from banks the regulators had 
been examining. However, in a more market-dominated 
context, in which many financial institutions have a presence in 
many cross-border business lines, obtaining the information 
on counterparty exposure and risks necessary to develop 
cogent analyses and to inform decision making in a possible 
crisis requires widespread cooperation across disparate entities. 
Moreover, in many instances, market participants may regard 
this information as proprietary. Scant availability of data and 
inadequate data sharing present challenges for regulators 
and market participants alike. 
Governor Kohn remarked that, as the prime source of 
constraint on potential crisis-causing behavior, market discipline 
through vigilance among private parties is always preferable to 
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regulatory dictates. For market discipline to be effective, however, 
counterparties must have a clear understanding of each other’s 
risk profile. This often requires them to share proprietary 
information, and confidentiality agreements between 
counterparties may be necessary to ensure comfort.
He acknowledged that market participants may be wary 
of sharing proprietary information. However, information 
sharing can greatly increase the probability that credit will 
continue to flow during systemic disruptions, resulting in a 
lower probability of a sustained systemic disruption, a reduced 
need for government intervention, and enhanced financial 
stability without moral hazard. 
Governor Kohn added that, in a market-based system, 
sound risk management by all market participants is essential 
to protect against the risk of a low-probability—or “tail”—
event causing a financial crisis. For example, the bringing 
together of practitioners in risk management policy groups can 
potentially lead to improved reporting of risk information to 
counterparties and allow best practices to be transferred across 
market participants with respect to valuation, exposure 
measurement, limit setting, and internal checks and balances. 
Indeed, a lesson drawn from the 1998 crisis by the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets (1999) was how 
weakness in risk management and counterparty credit 
discipline enabled a firm to acquire large leveraged positions 
of a size that could magnify the effects of negative events.
Governor Kohn described how financial regulators, through 
supervision, can promote market discipline and sound risk 
management. The regulatory capital framework proposed in 
Basel II would: 1) require the largest internationally active 
banking organizations to enhance measurement and 
management of their credit and operational risks, 2) prescribe 
a rigorous methodology for entities to assess overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile, and 3) require entities 
to disclose publicly information about their risk profile. 
Sound risk management practices among market 
participants rely heavily on sophisticated analytical methods 
that present challenges beyond limited data availability 
and information sharing. Discussions among economic 
researchers, financial market practitioners, and members of 
the engineering and natural sciences fields pointed to the 
considerable differences between the financial system and 
other complex systems. Among these differences is the inability 
to conduct or observe natural experiments on systemic crises 
in the financial system because crisis occurrences are too 
infrequent. Another difference is the role of human behavior in 
the financial system and the nonlinearities and anticipatory 
behavior it can introduce, a factor largely missing in studies 
of complex systems in engineering or the physical sciences. 
The presentations by financial market participants addressed 
these issues in discussions of scenario analysis. 
Scenario analysis, as Daula explained, is the primary tool 
that market participants use to examine the risks posed by 
systemic events. Aside from being what it implies, scenario 
analysis was defined by Daula in economic terms: It starts with 
a particular scenario about the economy and then defines a 
general equilibrium, inferring the conditional expectations of 
all the consequences of that scenario for markets around the 
globe and their relative prices. He identified three ways of 
specifying the scenario. The first is to look at historical 
episodes. This approach has the advantage of being grounded 
in an actual event; the drawback is that changes in market 
structure since the chosen episode can lessen the predictive 
power of the analysis. A second approach is to fashion a purely 
hypothetical event. This has the advantage of allowing one to 
match the scenario to the particular market structure at the 
time; the obvious drawback is the difficulty knowing with 
certainty whether the hypothetical event is at all likely or 
whether the analysis performed accurately reflects how the 
event would actually unfold. The third approach, which 
addresses some of the pitfalls of the previous two, is to use a 
hybrid, mixing in something that may have occurred in the past 
in a slightly different context and analyzing how it may play 
out in today’s context; conditional expectations for changes 
in market structure are adjusted along the way. 
It is difficult to choose the optimal scenario to analyze. 
Daula suggested a method that pointed to some possible 
interdisciplinary linkages between this type of financial 
research and engineering approaches to systemic risk: Choose 
a set of scenarios broad enough to span collectively the types 
of market fluctuation likely to be encountered. If the scenarios 
selected are sufficiently broad, common elements may emerge. 
Daula emphasized, though, that this type of exercise may result 
in unlikely scenarios. Providing an example, he noted that one 
often-considered scenario is a monetary crisis in a reserve 
currency such as the U.S. dollar, an event that arguably has not 
occurred in thirty years. Incorporating extreme tail events such 
as these would address Litzenberger’s concern that many 
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quantitative risk management approaches rely too heavily on 
data from relatively benign periods and thus allow history to 
grant a false sense of security.
The approach of collectively analyzing a broad range of 
scenarios may allow for linkages with optimization 
methodologies from engineering fields such as operations 
research. Presenting one possible inroad, Haimes offered an 
overview of the “partitioned multi-objective risk method,” in 
which systems are analyzed both for the low-frequency but 
high-cost events and for the high-frequency but low-cost 
events. Drawing on such mathematical work from engineering 
fields may also enable one to analyze how certain attempts to 
increase a system’s resilience and robustness may actually 
predispose the system to low-frequency but high-damage 
events. Needless to say, any such analysis must be very careful 
in its assumptions of probability distributions.10
Researchers and policymakers face many challenges in 
arriving at a better understanding of systemic risk in our 
evolving securities-market-dominated financial system. 
Market participants and regulators face a dual problem: 
They must determine the factors that can trigger contagion, 
the prospect for sudden regime shifts, and the potential for 
hysteresis; they must also craft policies that strengthen 
resilience to the threat of systemic events in a way that neither 
predisposes the system to even larger disruptions nor imposes 
unjustifiable costs on market participants.
10This topic is discussed in Goldenfeld and Kadanoff (1999).References
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